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Union Low-pay-worker Representation  
and the sans-papiers Strikes in France 
Ingrid Artus 
 
The article deals with the problem of union representation in the low-pay-
sector. Regarding especially (but not only) the situation in Germany, it 
claims a cultural gap between traditional unions and employees in the  
expanding precarious job sector. This is due to the difficult circumstances 
for worker interest representation in these sectors, but also to problems of 
the unions to deal with ‘crazy’ struggles typically erupting in this em-
ployment area. In the following the French case of the sans-papiers strike 
between October 2009 and summer 2010 is empirically examined as an 
example of relatively successful ‘bridge-building’ between established  
unions and precarious wage-earners. Although this case is also committed 
to specific French conditions, some things can be learned from it for a 
more general assessment of the topic of union politics in the low-pay area. 
Key words: low pay work, precarious work, interest representation,  
sans papiers-strike 
The structures and policies of (not only) the German union movement have 
been historically strongly characterised by the conditions enjoyed by male, 
domestic skilled workers. This is what up to today still makes up the bastion 
of union organising. In the large production operations of the (west-)German 
metal, electrical, chemical and mining industries, but also in banking and 
insurance, the unions are still strong, wages comparatively high, job condi-
tions and employer-employee relations well regulated, and there are consid-
erable opportunities for participation in workplace decision-making. But, in 
the wake of service-sector expansion, the feminisation of the labour-market, 
the growth of ethnic minorities in Germany as well as the ‘precaritisation-
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offensive’, undertaken by entrepreneurs and supported by the government, 
employment areas beyond the traditional union domains have developed 
dynamically. This is not only a special development in Gemany, but can be 
observed in very similar ways in most Western industrialised countries. The 
growing sector of precarious service work is the result of tertiarisation as well 
as of the destructuring of wagework (cf. Beaud/Pialoux 2004) in the context 
of massive unemployment and thus declining power resources of the employ-
ees, in the context of new economic strategies like outsourcing of services, 
commodification of reproduction work and privatisation of public services 
and in the context of wide-spread neo-liberal government strategies of de-
regulation and ‘workfare’. Thus traditional features of capitalist work, like 
precariousness and insecurity, are recurring into the industrialised urban 
centres and the number of people is growing, living there between precari-
ousness and exclusion (cf. Castel 2000).  
In the face of increasingly de-standardised and ‘de-socialised’ (cf. Wac-
quant 2009: 29) forms of waged employment, the unions’ well-regulated 
cores seem more and more like tiny, ever-dwindling islands of stability in an 
ocean of unregulated jobs. The following essay will report on the hard condi-
tions of survival on this rough sea, and try to help the ‘island’ inhabitants and 
those adrift on the sea to communicate with each other. Its theme, and central 
thesis, is the problem of the cultural gap between traditional orientations of 
the (not only) German unions, and those employed in the expanding low-
wage job sector. In other words: A union landscape in which functionaries, 
centralist and bureaucratic organisation forms, collective norms, professional 
identities and political strategies were formed in times when continual growth 
in prosperity, a relatively strong union movement, all-inclusive collective 
institutions (e.g. collective wage-bargaining, works-councils) could be taken 
for granted, were dominated by male, qualified skilled workers, and a funda-
mental political compromise existed with the entrepreneurial camp, must now 
make an effort to connect with segments of the economy in which all these 
conditions do not exist. This adaptation probably is essential for the unions, 
not only because of the ‘swelling flood’ of precarious service work, but also 
since the ‘rough survival conditions on the sea’ may indicate (at least a part 
of) the future of industrial relations in a globalised capitalist world.  




In the following, first the general circumstances for worker interest repre-
sentation in the low-pay sector are sketched (Ch. 1). Then it will be a ques-
tion of the points around which conflicts typically erupt in this employment 
area which can be addressed by initiatives of the German unions (Ch. 2). In 
the third chapter a concrete case is empirically examined that can be consid-
ered an example of relatively successful ‘bridge-building’ between estab-
lished union organisations and precarious wage-earners. This case comes (not 
accidentally) not from Germany, but from our western neighbour France. 
There, between October 2009 and summer 2010 around 6000 travailleurs 
sans papiers (‘workers without papers’, i.e. ‘undocumented’), with the 
support of the French union CGT, went on strike for a ‘regularisation’ (le-
galisation) of their (illegal) immigrant status (Ch. 3). The situation of ‘irregu-
lar’ migrants is admittedly an extreme case of precarious waged work, and 
conditions in France are in several ways not directly applicable to Germany 
or other countries. Nevertheless, from this case study some things can be 
learned that are important for a more general assessment of the topic of union 
politics of interest in the low-pay area (Ch. 4).  
Most of the empirical knowledge sketched below stems from empirical 
studies of interest representation in Germany and France carried out in 2003-
06 by the author, comprising in total 76 interviews in 18 German and 11 
French enterprises (cf. Artus 2008a). In Germany the research has been done 
in close collaboration with Sabine Böhm, Stefan Lücking and Rainer Trinc-
zek (cf. Lücking 2009). The French part has been made possible by a re-
search grant from the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris (10/2005-
8/2006). While all cases of these research projects have been anonymised, 
information about ‘real’ firms and enterprises cited below have mostly been 
found in the daily press or during expert conferences and discussions with 
union activists. All research interviews have been done in a decisively quali-
tative research tradition, focusing on the interpretation of the interviewed 
actors themselves and trying to give space to their own thematisations, per-
spectives and personal language. Theoretical background is a concept based 
on interaction theory, regarding especially processes of interest bargaining 
and representation (cf. Artus 2010). The French cases could not have been 
understood without intensive discussions with French colleagues and friends 
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(particularly Adelheid Hege and Christian Dufour from the Institut de Re-
cherches Economiques et Sociales). The social movement of the travailleurs 
sans papiers has been studied later on, during a one-week-research residence 
in France in February 2010. The description is based on two interviews (with 
a union responsible of the CGT and a strike activist), on the attendance of a 
strike delegates meeting, as well as on documents and several discussions 
with political activists in France. 
1. Interest representation in the low-pay sector: structural aspects 
The threshold of the low-pay sector is defined by the OECD standard as two-
thirds of the median wage. This was the amount of 9.06 Euro per hour in 
Germany in 2008.1 Over 6.5 million people there were then working for an 
hourly wage under this level. That was circa 21% of all employed (cf. 
Bispinck 2010). The percentage of low-wage employed in Germany has 
grown greatly in the recent past, in contrast to most other EU countries. It lies 
now markedly higher than that of other corporatist welfare states (e.g. France 
or the Netherlands) and instead varies around the level of the Anglo-Saxon 
liberal capitalist states (e.g. the UK and US) (cf. Bosch et al. 2008: 423). 
Low-wage work no longer is performed (if ever has been) only by part-timers 
needing to make ends meet with an extra job. It also involves a great number 
of full-time employed (cf. ibid.). German low-pay workers are also far from 
being primarily unqualified persons, in contrast to those in the US or UK. In 
2006 came ‘only about one-quarter of all low-pay employees from the group 
of the formally low-qualified (…). The share of employees with a completed 
occupational training or an academic degree from the total number of the 
low-pay employed has greatly increased (…) from 66.5% (1995) to 73.6% 
(2006) (…) – also in international comparison an extremely high number’ 
(Bosch et al. 2008: 427; cf. also Schäfer 2006).  
Low wages are not only being paid in areas without collective bargaining 
wage scales, or where these are not respected. In the past collective bargain-
                                           
1  This amount is for all of Germany. The separate low-pay thresholds West and East 
Germany are at 9.50 Euros (West) and 6.87 Euros (!) in the East (Bispinck 2010). 




ing parties have even quite officially agreed to wages under the low-wage 
threshold, e.g. in the florist branch, hairdressing, in the hotel and restaurant 
sector, agriculture and horticulture, but too in parts of the auto branch, meat-
cutting, retail and wholesale sales, as well as in transport and infrastructure 
(cf. Bispinck 2010). Also the new sectoral minimum wages (conforming to 
the Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz) are partly below the low-pay threshold, as 
in the refuse industry, electrical trades (east Germ.), building-cleaner trade, 
money and valuables transport services, care work (east Germ.), surveillance 
and security provision, as well as laundry services (ibid.) and the temporary 
work sector. The list of the branches concerned shows that work on low-wage 
terms is particularly in service areas where typically not only the wage level 
qualifies as precarious, but also job security, social security, working condi-
tions as well as the opportunities for worker participation often deviate 
negatively from usual societal standards (cf. for this Brehmer/Seifert 2008). 
Low paid work is (largely) precarious service work, disproportionately often 
carried out by women, migrants, East Germans as well as younger people (cf. 
ibid.). They have in common that their precarious working conditions 
scarcely permit any longer-term future planning, their efforts are undervalued 
by society and are often associated with personal experiences of disrespect.  
To summarise, two structural causes can be named for why a collective 
organisation of these employees in the areas mentioned along traditional 
union strategy lines is exceptionally difficult (cf. Artus 2008a, 2010a). First, 
in the precarious service sector there is typically a marked social fragmenta-
tion among the employed. This is true in three respects: in space and time, 
and culturally. Different from the case of big industrial workplaces where 
workers are spatially concentrated, work together simultaneously for long 
shifts and in the long term, precarious service work is carried out typically in 
arrangements that are spatially fragmented, discontinuous, short-term, with 
frequent personnel turnover or even by a lone worker. Part-time work, mini-
mal employment conditions and highly flexible working-time models are all 
obstacles to personal relations between workers. The level of personnel 
turnover in the workforce is high. This is partly due to rigid job conditions, 
partly also to the disproportionate number of younger employees who see 
their employment relationship instrumentally, as only a job for a limited time. 
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The cultural composition of the greatly fluctuating teams of workers strewn 
over many building-sites, branch locations, restaurants or temporary work-
places is highly heterogeneous: as heterogeneous as the reasons why people 
see themselves forced to accept doing precarious work at conditions well 
under society’s standards. Typical disadvantages for these workers are less 
often low formal qualifications, than lack of mobility or flexible time disposi-
tion (e.g. due to family needs or limited work- or residence permits), weak 
German-language skills, discontinuous work-biographies, lack of recognition 
of foreign educational and training credentials, but also personal physical 
limitations on work capability. Precariously employed service workers are 
people from many different countries, whose linguistic, cultural and political 
backgrounds vary to the extreme; students work beside childless wives 
wanting a little extra money, or single parents with extremely precarious 
family situations, the formerly imprisoned beside law-students, migrants with 
foreign university degrees beside others who can hardly read, and for the first 
time in their lives are working for wages. All this makes for not only consid-
erable communication problems, but also for differences of interest in terms 
of wages, working hours and union representation strategies. For bad humour 
also makes often the pressure to perform and deadlines, together with poor 
pay and permanent behavioural pressure to conform during work. That is 
why there is much conflict potential on the job, not so much between those 
‘above and below’, but between fellow workers. Bullying is common. The 
emergence of structures of simple camaraderie seems already difficult in such 
conditions, while the formation of anything like an effective collective inter-
est representation: nearly impossible. 
Thus it is, secondly, not accidental but rather immanently logical that the 
imbalance of power between capital and labour in these economic sectors is 
particularly apparent. Internationally active, powerful concerns with signifi-
cant labour-market sway and well-equipped legal departments stand here 
face-to-face with employees who are particularly weak in economic, cultural 
and social capital resources. Their workforce is often easily replaceable, and 
in times of mass structural unemployment, they have little employment 
alternatives, which makes them greatly vulnerable to existential pressure. 
Their low labour-market power and low structural power in the workplace is 




also scarcely compensated by the presence of union organisational power.2 
Precarious service jobs are traditionally not a focus of concern of the normal 
union apparatus.3 Consequently the level of organisation here is fairly low, 
and the union, ‘far off’.  
In a study on the question of why in Germany around 90% of all works-
council-eligible workplaces in practice possess no works-council (cf. Ell-
guth/Kohaut 2010), the sector of precarious service jobs emerged by far as 
the most repressive in form of management policy against the unions and 
worker participation (cf. Artus 2008a,c, 2010a; Lücking 2009). The mode of 
interaction between management and employees structures itself often as a 
relation of repression versus powerlessness. The workers are recruited (in the 
words of one personnel manager interviewed) according to the motto: ‘will-
ing and cheap’. They are considered and treated as a source of labour in need 
of discipline rather than as a bringer of productive or even creative results. 
Demanded is obedience and readiness to perform in the strict execution of 
given instructions. Working conditions are kept systematically precarious and 
the emergence of a core workforce is limited, in order to facilitate the re-
placement of no longer productive or willing individuals. There are compara-
tively rigid practices of direct control. Mistrust and disrespect maintain each 
other in a reciprocal relation. The relationship between superiors and em-
ployees can be described therefore, less as one of exchange than a one-
sidedly arranged set of rules that workers are confronted with in totalitarian 
style. They have only the choice between obedience and exit (quitting or 
being fired). The high rate of turnover (100% and more) is indeed due pri-
                                           
2  This differentiation of varying sources of power takes up a suggestion by Silver (2005: 
30-34) borrowed from E.O. Wright. It differentiates structural power, which itself can 
be differentiated into marketplace bargaining power and workplace (or production) 
bargaining power, from organisational or associational power. Organisational power 
emerges in this view from the formation of collective worker organisations, above all 
unions and political parties. 
3  This has changed somewhat in the most recent past in the wake of the general union 
membership crisis (cf. Ch.3).  
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marily to employee exit. Termination of the employment relation is the 
typical form of conflict resolution.4  
Altogether, the conditions for the creation of an opposing employee power 
are thus rather poor. And the entrepreneurial management on the other side is 
often very rigid and professional in the resolve to suffocate any collective 
movements tending in the direction of worker interest representation, if 
possible at the nascent stage. The repressive strategies of management are 
often thoroughly systematic, in the sense of the US ‘anti-union’ policies. 
These consist in terminating or buying off uncomfortable union activists; in 
massive internal workplace propaganda against the election of a works-
council; in using a range of legal means against critical employees (e.g. 
criminal charges, particularly often of theft), in massive attempts to influence 
works-council elections through intimidation or systematic ‘mind-changing’, 
in extreme cases also through collective punishment of disobedient branch 
locations, by, for example, exempting these from company-wide wage in-
creases, closing them or purposely letting them go bankrupt (cf. here i.a. 
Royle 2000, Bormann 2007, Artus 2008a,b,c). The managerial strategies of 
influencing elections as well as existing works-council committees are mas-
sively, systematically and permanently employed. They are, as a rule, suc-
cessful.  
In light of the imbalance of power, the attempt at union organisation and 
the establishment of some kind of workplace opposition can seem to be 
simply ‘crazy’ (Artus 2008b). It might thus seem, by contrast, more sensible 
to stay usually ‘under cover’ from the total power of management, and 
function as invisibly as possible, as long as possible. This pragmatic survival 
reflex, in the face of often difficult personal circumstances, also rests on a 
realistic assessment of workplace power relations. In the world of the pre-
cariously employed there are hardly experiences suggestive of the usefulness 
to them of individual or collective resistance, collective forms of organisation 
and interest representation. The largely uncritical conformity to the reigning 
                                           
4   In an extensive description of the interaction modi in the precarious service sector, two 
typical variants of social relations can be differentiated: Besides the above-described 
‘pure repressive’ management strategies, there are sometimes also policies with decid-
edly symbolic recognitional and communal elements (cf. Artus 2008a,b,c). 




conditions has therefore little to do with satisfaction, but is to be understood 
as the ‘choice of destiny’ (to use Bourdieu’s term) that adjusts one’s horizon 
of expectations to the realistically appraised givens. The dearth of hope for 
improvement in one’s life and work situation is the result of ‘intuitively 
perceived and progressively internalised objective possibilities’ (Bourdieu 
2001: 34).  
2.  ‘Crazy’ struggles and union initiatives in the low-pay sector:  
the problem of the cultural gap 
Yet, there are cases that make the headlines, like that of the supermarket 
cashier named Emmely. Active in a collective bargaining strike in the retail 
sector, she was fired with the justification that she had stolen a bottle-deposit 
ticket worth 1.30 Euro (cf. Hajek/Zattler 2009). She won her publicly effec-
tive struggle for reinstatement in her job in a final appeal to the German 
Federal Labour Court. Besides her, there are the ‘Schlecker’ retail cashiers 
who led a determined struggle for works-councils (cf. Bormann 2007). There 
are the McDonalds workers who in France struck for almost a whole year for 
better working conditions and the reinstatement of their colleagues (cf. Tie-
Internationales Bildungswerk 2003). There are the Teamster activists in the 
US who in the 1990s after a brutal labour struggle managed to organise a 
union at UPS, and their colleagues in the Turkish union Tümtis who (at the 
time of writing) are attempting similar organising in Turkey. They are strug-
gling for the reinstatement of the 161 employees fired by UPS for union 
organising. There are the strikers at London’s Heathrow Airport (Dufour 
2005) and those at Gate Gourmet in Düsseldorf (Flying Pickets 2007).When, 
and how does it come to such ‘precarious struggles’?  
First of all it should be stressed that in most of the cases mentioned above, 
it was a matter of defensive struggles against the impertinences of the entre-
preneurs or resistance to repressive measures. If one looks at the protagonists 
in such precarious struggles, it is typical that these are actors in comparison 
with whom the power disequilibrium is somewhat less obvious. They often 
possess a relative ‘extra something’ in the way of workplace-structural or 
even labour-market power. Thus, resistance to precarious conditions in the 
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rule emerges from a circle of core workers who have an above-average 
duration of workplace history5 and, sometimes, a somewhat elevated posi-
tion, e.g. that of overseer, or a team, shift or even branch supervisor. They 
know the workplace routines and many colleagues; and the colleagues know 
them. Often they may have in the past achieved modest advances in the 
workplace, because of their above-average commitment and qualification. In 
the case of a conflict these workers do not (always) resign, but (sometimes) 
keep trying to resolve them internally. Since they may have also routinely 
functioned as spokespersons for an employee collective, it is logical that later 
at a certain time they may do this again, but with other aims and means. 
Because they know well the collective problems from long experience, they 
can talk about them convincingly in concrete cases. The chances that col-
leagues and co-workers and those further down will join up, will also be 
better when the relatively powerless are led by a few who have just a bit of 
power.  
Sometimes the ‘precarious’ activists also have some competitive advan-
tage within the labour-market , i.e. because of their subjective situational 
assessment, or their objective life-situation as well as qualification, they are 
more prepared and able to risk their job in a ‘crazy struggle’ than others6. 
Probably the most important requirement for ‘raising one’s voice’ is being 
able to forego one’s job, or hinder an ‘exit’ (termination). This rather banal 
explanation from organisational sociology is fundamental for the conditions 
in the precarious service sector, for, not accidentally, many of the ‘precarious 
struggles’ mentioned above were (and are) fought over hindering job losses. 
The trigger for precarious struggles are also often not primarily material 
demands, e.g. higher pay. They are set off more often typically in cases of 
violating moral standards, to an extent even beyond the already humiliating 
                                           
5  An extremely interesting story of union struggle at Pizza Hut in France begins with the 
words of the author, a key activist: ‘I became a unionist because I’m nearsighted, very 
nearsighted’ (Mabrouki 2004: 17, author transl.). His visual handicap forced him to 
work as a dishwasher instead of as pizza deliverer. This position was, for its part, the 
reason why he could accumulate an unusually long duration of employment – which 
again was a basic requirement for his commitment as a union activist. 
6  The term ‘crazy’ originated with the interviewed activists themselves (cf. Artus 
2008b). 




routine treatment. Issues of respect and recognition play thus a central role. 
At issue is for example whether saleswomen more often than once per day 
should have the right to go to the toilet; whether in worker dressing rooms 
there should be surveillance cameras; whether a work-shy supervisor has the 
right to verbally abuse the workers as lazy do-nothings; and whether the 
shelves in a hypermarket really have to be cleaned with toothbrushes. Some 
employees also find it immoral that colleagues who have resisted undignified 
treatment are dismissed under the accusation of theft. Solidarity shown such 
colleagues and against obvious arbitrariness of some companies often marks 
the beginning of conflicts, in the course of which the improbable happens: the 
formation of an effective worker collective under precarious conditions. 
Typical of such precarious struggles is that they lead relatively fast to a 
quite sharp conflict situation often compared by participants to a ‘war’. By 
the time Emmely had to appeal to the Federal Labour Court to defend her 
rights, some of her colleagues had been dismissed two, three and four times 
and reinstated (cf. Rosa Luna 2009) or after a series of legal confrontations 
finally considered a hunger strike as a possible last recourse (cf. Artus 
2008b). In this unequal battle of a David and Goliath, to retain even a prayer 
of a chance, considerable personal endurance is required, great long-
windedness, as well as solid collective support structures not only at the 
workplace but also beyond. One might think that all this could be arranged 
through union support networks. In principle, and in some cases this is indeed 
so, but alas not always. The unions’ bureaucratic organisation structures, and 
the traditional orientation of union policy towards conditions favourable to 
well-organised industrial or office-work, give rise to various irritations and 
misunderstandings (cf. Artus 2008a,b). From the viewpoint of union func-
tionaries the question is understandably whether it is worthwhile to pick a 
fight with the all-powerful concerns, when even the all-company works-
council chairperson, who has a proper ‘Ver.di’ (German service-worker 
union) membership card and directs union influence in the company, plays 
down potential conflicts, and everybody is glad anyway that the concern 
holds to (at least) its own low-wage branch collective agreements; and any-
way it is clear that, with the lack of a big-enough membership base among 
employees there is hardly the power needed to force management to the 
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negotiating table if it decides to give up its formally recognised policy of 
cooperation between the ‘social partners’. It seems to make little sense to put 
much work and time into the organisation and defence of precariously em-
ployed, whose membership dues as such are negligible, and who in three 
months will probably change jobs again anyway. Union functionaries have 
anyway less and less time, because of fire-fights on more and more ‘fronts’.  
Admittedly, in recent years in German unions a slow but sustained aware-
ness has emerged that the organisation of the growing host of precariously 
employed workers is a matter of the unions’ own future, and must be dealt 
with if these are not to become the new dinosaurs of human history. This gets 
public attention, above all in the unions’ campaigns. The most influential of 
these in the media and politically has been probably the campaign for a 
minimum wage that was first taken up by the NGG (union of food industry 
and restaurants) and Ver.di (union of the service sector) (cf. Sterkel et al. 
2006) and, after long reluctance by IG Metall, could finally win over a major-
ity of unionists as well as citizens. The campaign resulted from the realisation 
that downward pressure on wages in many sectors (above all in precarious 
service work) in the medium term cannot be contained by the traditional 
collective bargaining policies. Thus on the one hand this is an admission of 
union weakness; on the other, a ‘reality check’: a pragmatic re-adjustment of 
traditional union strategies to new conditions on the ground. As the unions 
could get no further on their own, they launched public relations efforts and 
lobbying to mobilise the state as ally in the effort. Even though the concrete 
result of the campaign thus far has been limited to the half-hearted acceptance 
of various branch-specific minimum wages, the virulent and sustained politi-
sation of the question of a general minimum wage in Germany has been a 
nice success. But with only the aim of an overarching politisation of the 
public, the campaign goes beyond the organisation of the workplace member-
ship base, and in no way solves the problem of weak union penetration 
among precarious workers.  
Explicitly different cases are seen in the various organising campaigns 
conducted for about ten years now in different unions. The magic word 
organising spilled over early in the new century from the US to Germany. On 
that side of the Atlantic the service union SEIU achieved great success with a 




few of its organising campaigns (cf. Bronfenbrenner 1998, Dribbusch 1998, 
Voss/Sherman 2000, Choi 2008, Schroth 2009). The promise of membership 
growth, precisely in precarious sectors made the, supposedly in part transfer-
able, ‘techniques’ of organising attractive also for the German unions (cf. 
Hälker/Vellay 2006, Brinkmann et al. 2008, Dörre 2008, Birke 2010). The 
various [German] attempts however to strategically plan union organising 
campaigns, as it were‚ ‘on the drawing board’ and carry them out, were only 
a mixed, partial success. The effort to politicise precarious, exploitative 
conditions and ‘scandalise’ with them (as in the ‘Lidl campaign’, cf. Ha-
mann/Giese 2004; Hamann et al. 2006) did in fact succeed. Sustainable 
membership effects, which was and is the primary goal of efforts such as in 
the Hamburg surveillance industry (cf. Dribbusch 2008, Birke 2010), in the 
warehouses of the Otto mail-order company, or also in the hospital sector, 
could be realised only to a very limited degree. This was also true of the 
extensive campaign of IG Metall on the issue of sub-contract employment. 
Many of the temporaries who had been organised at great effort quit the 
union again when it could not protect them from redundancy during the 
world economic crisis of 2008. 
Even despite apparent problems with union attempts to penetrate the pre-
carious employment sectors, overall a definite increase in conflicts there can 
be ascertained (cf. Renneberg 2006, Bewernitz 2008). These take place 
sometimes in the traditional forms of collective bargaining mobilisation (as in 
the strike in retail sales), and sometimes the unions try out new tactics and 
strategies. In early 2009 for instance, the traditional ‘strong male Ver.di-
fighters’ of the waste collection sector were replaced by the dynamic, mostly 
young female day-care workers who exposed with great energy, creativity 
and original ideas their bad working conditions and low pay. In repeated, 
mostly one-day nation-wide strike actions they demonstrated considerable 
fighting strength in the middle of an economic crisis. Not only the public but 
also many Ver.di officials were surprised by the dynamism of the movement. 
That their demand for, at first glance rather unspectacular, new health protec-
tion regulations would prove so mobilising, many people had not expected. 
The goal of a collectively bargained health protection agreement was con-
trived by Ver.di as rather a kind of political bargaining trick to be able to 
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demand, despite the workers’ existing legally valid wage agreement, an 
increase in compensation. The child-care workers instead took seriously the 
content of this justification for the strike. The call for better working condi-
tions symbolised the collective feeling that their work in nurseries and day-
care facilities was not being sufficiently respected by society. The longing for 
more respect, largely responsible for the strike’s dynamism, was symbolised 
much better in the form of this demand than it would have in a 5% or even 
10% pay rise demand. The issue of health protection became in this way a 
symbolic ‘bookmark’ in a struggle with its focus on societal recognition and 
valorisation of ‘typically female’ service work in a low- (or a bit higher-) 
wage sector. This day-care worker strike was also original in their attempt to 
carry the discussion systematically beyond the boundaries of the collective 
bargaining parties. The children’s parents (those mainly affected by the 
strike) were, as far as possible, informed and involved in the strike. The 
moral justifications for the labour conflict were a systematic departure from 
the traditional realm. Beyond wage-justice and fair distribution of societal 
resources, further fundamental questions were raised, such as, what values 
and services are central to a society that wants to secure the life-chances of 
future generations.  
New strike tactics came to be used also in diverse conflicts and struggles 
in the area of cinemas. These were in part organized by Ver.di (e.g. at Cine-
maxX and Ufa), sometimes only informally coordinated with Ver.di, or even 
took place with Ver.di excluded (e.g. at the Berlin cinema Babylon). The 
employees in the cinema branch are often hired on termed contracts and work 
in various highly flexible part-time shift systems. After, for example, in 2004 
the nation-wide cinema giant CinemaxX terminated the existing collective 
contract, it began paying new employees an hourly wage of only slightly 
above 6 Euros. Four long years the CinemaxX employees agitated at many 
locations in Germany, using kind of ‘pin-prick’ tactic, for uniform, subsis-
tence-ensuring level of wages. Union activists determined, often short-term 
and autonomously, which shifts would strike for one-and-a-half hours (and 
with that causing the cancellation of a film showing). Parallel to that they 
sought contact with cinema-goers and in fantasy-filled actions tried to inform 
the public on the issue of cinemas’ low pay and their refusal of collective 




bargaining agreements. After four years of low-threshold but stubborn bar-
gaining discussions, CinemaxX finally declared its readiness to (again) 
conclude a collective agreement which would at least set limits on the free 
fall of employee wages. 
Here certainly other cases of conflicts breaking out in low-pay areas could 
be mentioned, such as the strike of building cleaners at IG BAU in late 2009. 
The overall picture of interest representation in the low-wage sector is in any 
case strongly dynamic and potentially conflictual. Because of the relative 
weakness of employees, the conflicts often are long and drawn-out, character-
ised by intransigence on both sides. The struggles are vicious and stubborn, 
and over changes that in material value sometimes seem hardly worth the 
effort, but are (also) powerfully symbolic and marked by a will to win the 
respect and recognition of society. Though it is to be acknowledged that, 
overall, the unions are in no way inactive, their strategies until now have 
shown only mixed results, and some systematic problems can be identified. 
These are inherent on the one hand in structural weaknesses of the employed; 
on the other, in part by cultural and in part political-interest gaps between the 
precariously employed and union apparatus. How can the latter be explained? 
The realities of precarious service work are different than what is usual 
for union organising, in terms of work conditions, management policies and 
patterns of conflict. A union functionary who went through occupational and 
union socialisation in the 1970s and 80s in such well-organized environments 
as the German Post or huge retail hypermarkets, will have understandably 
considerable difficulties imagining the repressive conditions and extreme 
conflict situations like at Pin AG (a private postal service) or the retail dis-
counters Aldi and Lidl. Their lack of first-hand knowledge of conditions on 
the ground reduces the usefulness of unionists’ advice. Cases of striking 
misassessments and strategic mismanagement by union functionaries have 
happened often in this situation. Problems also arise when the ‘new’, ‘pre-
carious’ activists scarcely resemble traditional union personnel in gender, 
ethnic origin and social position. The development of a trusting relationship 
between, for example, a young cashier of Turkish origin whose family was 
perhaps politically persecuted, and a 50-year-old social-democratic affiliated 
union functionary who over decades in the ranks of bureaucratic experts has 
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become a specialist in the complex material of collective bargaining, though 
not impossible, is also not self-evident. There is also a systematic dispropor-
tion between the exorbitant demands made on the unions by the precariously 
employed during their individually high-risk, ‘crazy’ struggles for recogni-
tion and justice, and a union’s organisational logic that measures the success 
of its policies often above all in terms of increases in membership numbers. 
That here disappointments will not be long in appearing, is clear. Relations 
between the precarious activists and the unions are thus, not rarely, afflicted 
by misunderstandings and considerable mutual irritation.  
As an example of such a ‘crazy struggle’ we give here the conflict experi-
enced by Fatima.7 It took place not in Germany but in France, and is thus in 
some respects characteristic for conditions there. A particularly drastic case, 
it is still in its basic structure thoroughly similar to the situations of any 
number of German ‘Emmelys’ working anywhere between Flensburg and 
Lake Constance:  
Fatima is the daughter of an Algerian family who in the 1950s immigrated 
to France. Her father worked in the northern French mining region. She was 
born in 1965 as the first of many children. As her parents in the 70s left the 
country with a repatriation premium in their pockets, she chose to remain in 
France, though still a young girl. She left school at 14 without finishing any 
qualification. A hairdresser training she started was also broken off, so she 
took care of elderly people and did child-minding. As an ‘animatrice’ for 
children and youth she did achieve an officially recognised qualification, but 
her pay rarely exceeded the minimum wage. At 19 after an unplanned preg-
nancy she had a first daughter. She married the father and seven years later 
followed a son. As she landed a job in 1989 at a nation-wide discount book-
store chain, she was enthusiastic about her new activity. It meant for her daily 
contact with a world of culture and education, to which she had hardly any 
access before: her parents could never read or write. She describes herself as 
an autodidact. With commitment and growing competence she rose relatively 
fast to branch-outlet supervisor and direct superior to three or four employ-
ees. She worked round the clock, often seven days a week. Her pay was still 
                                           
7  The name has been changed. 




low, but she says of her then employer: ‘Sure, they exploited us, but never 
questioned our dignity’. This changed in 1997 as the firm, after an embez-
zlement affair, went bankrupt and was sold to a new owner. In this situation 
Fatima became involved in setting up a union organisation representing the 
company’s workers, which was in future to keep an eye on management’s 
doings. Her arguments struck a chord with colleagues. Within a short time 
she had organised into the CGT union over 60 employees who worked in the 
extensive small branch outlets. This brought her some attention and respect at 
CGT and she was named the main union delegate from the company. But the 
struggle, far from won, was only beginning. There began a period of confron-
tations with management, not over wage increases, but about the concretisa-
tion of rights that, in the French Code du Travail, are guaranteed each and 
every worker: allowing cashiers to sit, for example, or (at workplaces without 
toilet facilities) the right to more than one pre-paid visit per workday to a 
nearby pay toilet. Management answered with systematic strategies to de-
stroy her morale: Fatima was continually transferred to new branch locations, 
her work was monitored for errors, or she was provoked into making insult-
ing remarks. Employees were often warned of contact with the troublemaker, 
and thereafter did so often only secretly. Still, she organised a total of four 
strikes, and was dismissed four times, i.a. for defamation and damaging the 
reputation of her employers. She had reported to interested media representa-
tives the causes of the labour unrest. On the frequent repressive strategies of 
management she commented with the words: ‘You can get depressed about 
it, or you start to defend yourself.’ When going to work in the morning, she 
now had the feeling of ‘going to war’ instead. She never knew what awaited 
her. Crucial for her ‘workplace survival’ was on the one hand a permanent 
self-control over her behaviour, and on the other, that she kept the responsi-
ble labour inspectors informed of all goings-on at work. Because conditions 
there were known, cases of new dismissals were anticipated and not allowed. 
At the beginning she had had no idea what she was getting into with the 
union involvement. After some years of confrontations she developed how-
ever the necessary resistance to the repressiveness of management: ‘After all, 
it’s them (management) who made me into what I am.’ She ultimately won all 
court cases and had to be reinstated in her job three times. But it was costly. 
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‘In the end you're only working off the legal fees’. At the last court case 
therefore her legal advisor recommended taking the settlement offered. As 
the court documents grew massive, she saw she could not hold through the 
conflict any more. Thus she finally settled out of court. At the time of the 
interview she was retraining for computer and office-work. She is not really 
bitter about the repressive actions taken by her employer, after all they were 
perhaps to be expected. But she is bitter about the lack of solidarity shown to 
her by CGT. Repeatedly the union showed itself unwilling to give her unbu-
reaucratic help in sudden conflicts, not even with such items as copy ma-
chines or other material aids (telephone, fax). She received no financial 
support either during the strikes or ensuing legal battles. Dissonances also 
resulted from her taking the union principle of ‘rank-and-file’ democracy a 
bit too literally. As she was called to sit on the executive committee of her 
local union branch, she wanted thorough information about the origin and use 
of union money before she would agree to proposed budgets. Union insiders 
interpreted this as a lack of trust, and a breach in solidarity. As she also, in a 
newspaper article, expressed criticism of the union, she and some like-
minded colleagues heard the charge: ‘Vous êtes des electrons libres’: You 
people are like free electrons who can’t conform to the discipline of the 
organisation. For her part, she reproaches the union that they ‘played at 
politics while we were fighting for survival.’ But she has still not quit the 
union, because ‘I believe one has to get involved. I’ll try as long as possible 
to change things from the inside.’  
Fatima’s conflicts as sketched above contain many elements found also in 
Germany and other countries with similar situations. Accordingly, it is dis-
proportionately often people with a migration background who engage in 
such ‘crazy’ struggles, especially those who are comparatively well inte-
grated in society. In their workplace conflicts there is thus an inherently more 
comprehensive struggle against daily discrimination and for societal emanci-
pation. Quite distinct in the case of Fatima are the cultural fault lines between 
the precariously employed and the established union organisations: Tradi-
tional union rituals are not accepted as self-evident, but questioned as to their 
justification; needs arising out of intensifying, and in their course sometimes 




unpredictable struggles collide with unwieldy bureaucratic administration 
structures.  
Of course we need to add that the gap between the precariously employed 
and union organisations is not only to be understood as a cultural one, but 
sometimes also as an expression of opposing political interests within an 
organisation whose members are in competition with each other on the labour 
market. This is particularly true when traditional union clientele and precari-
ously employed do not work in different branches, but are employed side-by-
side in one and the same large workplace. A majority of DGB members, for 
example, are among the permanent workforce at their companies. Their 
perspective sees the extension of union solidarity to the precariously em-
ployed (who at the same time are not often union members) quite ambiva-
lently. Though many core workers too now feel and are indirectly threatened 
by precariousness tendencies and the downward pressure on wages, at the 
same time, the existence of precariously employed offers them, indirectly, a 
certain protection: a ‘redundancy reserve’ for bad times, so to speak. It makes 
possible a hierarchical segregation and elevation of the ‘regulars’ from the 
precariously employed: an important symbol of individual self-esteem. This 
ambivalent situation of political interest becomes especially clear, and the 
correspondingly ambivalent union policy in a matter such as subcontracting, 
but also in the representation of foreign or ‘irregular’ workers. ‘Union poli-
cies vary in reference to migration (…) between rejection and efforts at 
organising, between exclusion and integration, equal and special treatment’ 
(Schmidt/Schwenken 2006: 42). 
The question: what forms of support from the view of established union 
organisations and their members are ‘worthwhile’ in helping to self-help 
those who are especially weak on the labour market, is also the focus of the 
following case. Or, put otherwise: How far does union solidarity actually go?  
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3. Union interest-representation beyond traditional domains:  
the strike of the French travailleurs sans papiers 
The beginnings of and background to the strike of the travailleurs sans 
papiers (‘workers “without papers”’) reach back to 2006-07.8 During that 
time in the Parisian ‘Banlieue’ emerged an instance of close, action-oriented 
co-operation between the CGT (or at least one central CGT activist) and 
single collectives of ‘irregular’ migrants. In 2006 a group of migrant workers 
in the cleaning firm ‘Modeluxe’ in the Département of Essone occupied the 
company in protest against the working conditions and to achieve their 
‘regularisation’: with success. A similar work-action took place in 2007 in 
the steak restaurant ‘Buffalo Grill’. At the end of November 2007 in the so-
called Loi Hortefeux, the newly passed French immigration law, a passage 
was agreed, which explicitly provided for the possibility of migrant legalisa-
tion through waged work. This was subject however to a rather tough restric-
tion: The employee should be able to present a work contract of at least one 
year in an area of activity affected by a dearth of available labour. An official 
list was to define these sectors. The application for legalisation should also be 
lodged by the employer, which would have brought employees into a direct 
dependence on and obligation to employers, in the sense, ‘The boss gave me 
work, and got me my papers too’ (Blanche 2009: 21). In this situation the 
CGT had the idea of using the new legislation for shop-floor based forms of 
work-action: In early 2008 nine travailleurs sans papiers who were illegally 
employed as cooks in the luxury restaurant ‘Grande Armée’ on the Champs-
                                           
8  In a further sense the strike can be admittedly ordered into the considerably longer 
history of struggles by the sans-papiers in France which had a first high point in 
1996/97 and have continued (with variable potency) since then (cf. Cissé 2002). In the 
course of many occupations, demonstrations and hunger-strikes the earlier image of 
the (tendentiously suspected of being criminal, illegal) clandestins has changed into 
that of the sans-papiers, who are the victims of the state’s ‘illegalisation’ practice, be-
ing denied regular residence permits and other legal documentation. The sans-papiers 
are thus a ‘mature’ movement in France with a history, organisational experience and 
considerable public notoriety. The organisation of the sans-papiers as travailleurs 
sans papiers within the framework of waged-worker organisation and in close associa-
tion with the unions means however a ‘qualitative leap’ (cf. Terray 2009). 




Elysée, demanded the legalisation of their residence and employment status 
with the support of the CGT. The case aroused great media interest, and the 
cooks were ‘regularised’ without delay. Further work-actions were intended, 
by way of spectacular single cases in the media, to cause the issuance of a 
general circulaire (a ministerial order to the prefectures, i.e. the police and 
immigration authorities in the départements), which would guarantee the 
sans-papiers generally a legal protection during the procedure of legalisation 
(which was often characterised by irregular and arbitrary treatment).  
With this aim the ‘April-15th-2008 Movement’ was declared (cf. Schmid 
2008, Rondeau/Esquerre 2009).9 It comprised 300 strikers employed in 15 
companies: retail sales (‘Paris Store’), restaurants (‘Chez Papa’, ‘Mountain 
Pizza’, ‘Passion Traiteur’), the refuse business (‘Veolia’), clothing industry 
(‘Fabio Lucci’), hotels (‘la Jatte’) and others. The work-action was secretly 
prepared, and on 15 April 2008 the activists (mainly men from the French-
speaking regions of equatorial Africa as well as the ‘Maghreb’) occupied 
their workplaces. With that they appeared ‘from out of the shadows’ of the 
black economy and into the public eye (cf. Blanche 2009: 20). Then on the 
1st of May, this time morer visible, they marched in a cordon behind a banner 
with the slogan ‘on bosse ici, on vit ici, on reste ici’ (‘we work here, we live 
here, we'll stay here’). Among them the firms being struck were indicated, 
framed by CGT emblems and waving CGT flags (cf. Rondeau/Esquerre 
2009: 4f.). On the next day, on May 2, 2008, the travailleurs sans papiers 
occupied a union local in the city centre, where they intended to live, sleep 
and engage in politics for the following period. This action is not mentioned 
in the glossy CGT official report on the movement (Rondeau/Esquerre 2009). 
                                           
9  Legalisation of residence status was the centrepiece of the demands, while other topics 
(wage levels, working conditions) were treated as side-issues. The downward pressure 
on wages is in France currently weaker than in Germany because the state minimum 
wage has a normative function even in the black economy. In the statement of the in-
terviewed CGT official, a majority of the travailleurs sans papiers receive the mini-
mum wage, which was 8.86 Euros per hour at the time of the interview. The ‘patrons-
voyous’ (employer bandits) who pay migrants two or three Euros per hour, she thinks 
are sporadic cases. ‘Regularisation’ of residence status, she said, was of central impor-
tance to the workers’ being able to defend themselves against employer transgressions, 
above all demands for an extreme flexibility in terms of time and mobility.  
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The union local was, over one year later in the summer of 2009, violently 
cleared by CGT hirelings.  
The negotiations between CGT and the responsible ministry proved this 
time quite a lot tougher than in the case of the nine cooks. Nonetheless there 
were some successes in the course of 2008. Then, as in January 2009 the 
government minister was replaced (M. Hortefeux was succeeded by M. 
Besson), the state’s legalisation practices changed too. Increasingly, legalisa-
tion applications with fictitious justifications were rejected. The independent 
movement of ‘illegalised’ migrants in the union local also brought out em-
phatically several ‘blind’ spots in the CGT’s politics up to then. That particu-
lar group of sans-papiers did not share systematically in the collectively 
hard-won legalisations, as they were often singly employed and therefore 
could not publicly represent themselves as a collective possessing a certain 
power to impose their postulates. A similar problem concerned the temporary 
workers who cannot demonstrate a continuous employment by a single 
employer, e.g. those working in personal care services, (short-term) child-
minders (‘nannies’) in multiple families or as cleaners sent to multiple house-
holds by different employers simultaneously and/or successively. Thus a 
new, still more extensive strike movement was planned that should inform a 
wider public. A ‘Committee of Eleven’ was created, comprising five unions 
(CGT, CFDT, Solidaires, UNSA, FSU) and six civil associations, e.g. the 
‘League for Human Rights’, ‘Network for Education Without Borders’, etc.. 
In an open letter to the Prime Minister Fillon they demanded uniform and 
binding regulations in the legalisation process for waged workers, which 
should also solve the problem of the temporaries, the discontinuously and 
sporadically employed.  
On October 11, 2009 began the new strike. At the first strike meeting 
around 1300 sans-papiers were present. Their numbers increased in the 
following months to c. 6000 strikers from 2100 different companies. Among 
these were the biggest ‘temporaries’ firms (e.g. Adecco), the building indus-
try, security and surveillance trades, cleaning trades, hotels and restauration, 
as well as sub-contractors in general. Only c. 500 of the strikers were women, 
above all many Asian women employed at home sewing clothes, and some 
90 women working as home-carers (aide à la personne) in private house-




holds. The main focus of the movement was the Paris region, though it began 
to reach far beyond, with workers and companies in 38 French départements 
ultimately participating. The coordination and creation of an infrastructure 
for the strike was thus a great challenge. The CGT issued all participants a 
strike ‘ID card’ that, for many, represented the first ‘official’ document they 
possessed in their new homeland.10 The CGT sent the firms of all strikers 
information on which of their employees was participating, so that, by French 
law, these could not be dismissed. Also the state Labour Inspectorates (in-
spections du travail) and the Ministry of Labour were given the names, which 
at least from a German perspective would seem quite a risky act given the 
illegalised residence status of the strikers. Also the names of the employer 
companies were made officially known to the authorities. Following this 
however the authorities took no legal steps against either the former or the 
latter, quite to the contrary. Strikers stopped by the police profited by an 
accord tacit (silent agreement) between the state and the unions, whereby 
strike participants would benefit from a certain immunity.11 Co-ordination 
among the strikers was ensured through the regular delegate assemblies held 
at the CGT central. Furthermore, around 25 pickets were set up in the Paris 
region. These were set up in front of the workplaces being struck, but also at 
the larger firms who contract out to the sub-contractors employing the strik-
ers. Employer confederations and state institutions were also publicity-
effective locations for strikers. At the same time CGT sought support for the 
strike in the entrepreneur camp: In fact, more than a few employers were 
                                           
10  The strike identification card had thus a similar function as e.g. the union membership 
card with photo that are issued by unions in some countries to ‘irregular’ migrants and 
for them are often the only form of quasi-official identification they have. This practi-
ce of written union recognition of ‘illegalised’ migrants exists e.g. in the US in the 
AFL-CIO, as well as in the UK unions federation TUC (cf. Schmidt/Schwenken 2006: 
44).  
11  The practice that strikers hardly have to fear criminal sanctions is a particularity of the 
French political culture, which has very liberal strike laws, and understands protest as 
a kind of civil obligation. This practice was and is also observed in many of the 
previous periodic waves of French strikes (cf. Artus 2010b). Thus, the interviewed 
CGT official related that in all the struggles of recent years only a dozen or so activists 
had been deported and these were only cases in which the union learned too late of the 
arrests to be able to intervene.  
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prepared to join in the demands of the ‘Committee of Eleven’ for dependable 
legalisation criteria, because the long-term employment of the workers was 
also in their interest in the face of labour-shortages in the branches con-
cerned. Ultimately even the employer confederation MEDEF supported the 
movement. 
The negotiations with the government were drawn out, not least because 
regional elections were to be held in France in mid-March 2010, and com-
promises on immigration-policy questions seemed in this situation inconven-
ient for Sarkozy’s conservative government. For the strikers who received 
from the CGT only a symbolic cash support of around 200 Euro per month, 
the duration of the strike meant increasingly an unbearable existential burden. 
Many began to work illegally again in new jobs, in order to survive. Al-
though picketing was maintained, the number of those really striking began 
to crumble.  
In spring 2010 the action began again to intensify. In May 2010 a group of 
sans-papiers made a publicity-attracting march on foot from Paris to Nice. 
This action was carried out by a group independent of the CGT and the 
‘Committee of Eleven’, the same which, after the clearance of the union local 
had again taken over another [union] building, this time in Rue Baudelique 
(cf. Bell 2010). The cleavage between the sans-papier movement, supported 
by the CGT, and the group mentioned above has different sources: Most of 
the sans-papiers of the Rue Baudelique came, in contrast to most activists 
near to the CGT, often from countries in which French is not the national 
language (e.g. Turkey or Kurdistan). These were often single travailleurs 
sans papiers who would have hardly benefited from the collective CGT strike 
actions. Differently from the ‘Committee of Eleven’, they demanded also the 
unconditional legalisation of all sans-papiers, not ‘only’ the ‘regularisation’ 
of travailleurs sans papiers by waged work. Although it is quite difficult (if 
not impossible) to attribute coherent political positions to each of the two 
groups, more radical political positions were surely more wide-spread among 
the activists in the Rue Baudelique. They sometimes claimed deeper struc-
tural changes of a capitalist world whereas the CGT movement clearly and 
only aimed inclusion of the travailleurs sans papiers into the French econ-
omy and society. Limiting the movement to integrative demands, they could 




hope and ultimately succeeded in attaining the support even of a part of 
French employers. However after the direct confrontation of the two move-
ments in the wake of the union local ejection in summer 2009, they subse-
quently operated, if not solidarily, at least largely without conflicts, in paral-
lel (cf. Bell 2010, Schmid 2010).  
To give their demands symbolic emphasis, the sans-papiers in late May 
also occupied the steps and the square in front of the Paris Opera on Place 
Bastille. Supported by i.a. the CGT, they persisted there for several weeks, 
even after the police cleared the square temporarily on 1 June. They departed 
only on June 18, 2010, when, ‘satisfied with progress achieved, they declared 
the end of the occupation’ (Schmid 2010: 8), which at the same time was the 
end of the strike. The compromise reached by the Committee of Eleven and 
state authorities made it possible in the future for workers to ‘add’ several 
employments together, and now temporary jobs could qualify workers for the 
right to ‘legalisation by waged work’. However only personal applications 
would be considered which were made to the prefectures between July 1, 
2010 and March 31, 2011, with the support of the union organisations. Immi-
gration minister Besson reckoned with c. 6000 legalisations, and perhaps 
70% of the strikers being able to fulfill the given conditions. The prior legali-
sation method of ‘cas par cas’ (case by case), i.e. individual, single-case 
decisions, repeatedly criticised by the sans-papiers movement, was thereby 
not repealed at all, but on the contrary consciously preserved by the state. At 
the same time however, this movement achieved the establishment of the 
principle of legalisation by waged work as a means of struggle for the sans-
papiers and the union movement as well, who furthermore, at least in part 
during the strike actions, joined into a single common movement. The CGT 
evaluated the result in any case as a success and a sign that they could estab-
lish a foothold in representing the ‘precaritised’, i.e. migrant proletariat. 
4.  Interest representation in the German and French low-pay sector: 
comparative and summarising suggestions for union practice 
The example of the French travailleurs sans papiers shows the potential and 
the problems of an interest representation of workers who do not belong to 
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the traditional union clientele. It is interesting, to start with, that the question 
of recruiting membership in the French case played an absolutely secondary 
role. This had surely to do with the character of the French unions, whose 
organisational existence depends in far lower measure (than German or US 
unions) on membership dues and much more on state aid to organisations. 
French union staff, for example, often are financed by the state or large 
employers, allowing full-time functionaries to be seconded from their jobs, 
staying however on the payroll. Union locations are rent or sold by the state 
for quite low, even symbolic amounts. According to the French work legisla-
tion, most employers are forced to pay considerable sums for qualification 
and social affairs to the employee representatives, mostly identical with union 
representatives; so unions can benefit indirectly from such legal regulations 
(cf. Artus 2008a: 177ff.). For this reason in the CGT, egoistic organisational 
motives count for less during the strike oft the ‘travailleurs sans papiers’; 
much stronger is the fundamental political and strategic significance that 
organising the most vulnerable sections of the modern proletariat has for the 
total union movement. To organise those people who, for various reasons, are 
a particularly vulnerable labour force, is now more than ever with globalisa-
tion and intensified migrations, a necessity. One CGT activist, in an inter-
view, said in so many words: ,Je ne fais pas de l’humanitaire, je fais du 
syndicalisme.’ (‘I don’t do humanitarianism, I do union politics.’), and ‘On 
défend le salariat, pas les pauvres.’ (‘We defend wage-earners, not the 
poor.’) This is also the intent, for example, in setting up legal help points for 
‘illegalised’ migrants in Hamburg, Munich, Berlin and Frankfurt: not primar-
ily moral or humanitarian aid, but the creation of solidarity between variously 
empowered groups of workers. ‘Prendre pieds chez les précaires’ (‘Get a 
foothold among the precarious’), as the interviewed CGT-activist called it, in 
this perspective is a question of union survival, not for reasons of member-
ship recruitment, but to hinder a trend of disastrous ‘social dumping’ that 
impacts all dependent employed. 
This fundamental realisation, of course, does not eliminate contradictions 
between different groups of the employed or within union organisations. The 
question, how far union solidarity can and should be extended, is also in the 
French context, a permanent theme. It has structured the relation of tension 




between CGT-dominated groupings and the parallel current of ‘sans papiers’ 
in the Rue Baudelique, just as within the internal discussion at CGT. The 
travailleurs-sans-papiers strikers who collected money for their cause in 
front of the CGT building, were met by the mistrustful looks of more than 
one union official. Although the strike was officially supported by CGT 
General Secretary Thibault and presumably a majority of CGT members, the 
‘cause of the precarious’ is within the union still a secondary one, if not even 
mainly just the special concern of a few single officials who are committed to 
the issue. Analogous to the German situation, also in CGT there are lines of 
argumentation by which precarious forms of employment are considered a 
necessity to keeping national or company locations attractive in the interna-
tionally competitive struggle.  
The fight of the travailleurs sans papiers, in the course of which the num-
ber of strike participants increased in a veritable landslide, shows on the one 
hand the immense need, and the potential for union interest-representation in 
low-pay job areas; at the same time it makes clear however also the problems 
in bridging the cultural gap between the particularly vulnerable and socie-
tally only conditionally integrated parts of the proletariat, and the established 
union colossi who can lay self-assured claim to their place in the political 
system. The CGT did solve the difficult problem of ‘unity in action’, in 
continuity with the relatively decentralised and constitutively worker-oriented 
French union culture, by ostentatiously rejecting a strong direct representa-
tive function. The union emphasises that it stood ‘beside’ those struggling 
(not at their head) and ‘supported’ the work-actions (actually led however by 
the travailleurs sans-papiers themselves). Whether such a form of loose co-
ordination between unions and ‘grass-roots’ movements is transferable to 
Germany, seems at least doubtful. At the least, it would require a definite 
shift in thinking. The danger of a loss of control over the not (yet) solidly 
union-socialised ‘new troops’ would scare DGB unions quite a lot more than 
the CGT, whose officials describe their daily routine with the words: ‘You 
can’t keep anybody from doing what they want, or make anybody do what 
they don’t want to. Union politics means then just co-ordinating whatever 
happens.’ The maintenance of a certain distance, with at the same time the 
assurance of unconditional solidarity, could however not even in France 
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assuage the structural problem of the high expectations that the ‘precarious’ 
activists, in their strongly existentially-coloured struggles, place on the 
presumably ‘strong’ union organisations, and who at the same time have an 
(often not wholly unjustified) latent insecurity over whether the established 
organisation’s commitment to their issues is as earnest as their own is.  
Bridging the cultural gap is in any case not easy. Important steps in this 
difficult process could be: First, the realisation that the representation of 
workers in precarious low-pay sectors requires other strategies than those 
used in fordist mass production. In the light of the diversity of working 
conditions in different jobs, and of the cultural and personal backgrounds of 
the workers, there is probably also no one correct strategy of organising. 
These must be more diverse and variable, and be more oriented to the con-
crete conditions, than in the past. In this sense, it is a matter of questioning 
and rethinking traditional political wisdom or, to be ‘à l’écoute’ (‘listening 
up’) to what problems are ‘out there’ and what solutions are emerging. Such 
a context sensitive, organisation-cultural ‘learning’ of interest representation 
under precarious conditions implies necessarily also the recruitment of 
workers with plausible social contacts to (or from) the ‘precariat’. This would 
mean a significant increase in the participation of women as well as persons 
with a migration background in the unions’ apparatus of officials. Precisely 
for German realities, in which traditionally more compromise-oriented 
representation strategies are established than in for example France, this 
would mean also learning how to act in extremely sharp conflict situations. 
The topics of repression and corruption (e.g. of workplace-council members) 
as systematic entrepreneurial strategies must be discussed, at least besides or 
even prior to that of the ‘social dialogue’. That implies also a more intensive 
rethinking of the possibilities for union action in sectors where in the medium 
term there may be no works-councils or collective bargaining, or in which 
union action may eventually have to impose itself against [existing but] 
corrupt worker-representation institutions. Exaggerated hopes of membership 
increases and easy organising are probably undue. The interest representation 
of low-pay workers will be surely a Sisyphean task in adverse conditions, but 
for unions in post-fordism, strategically central and unavoidable.  
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